An Iterative Quadratic Method for General-Sum Differential Games with
  Feedback Linearizable Dynamics by Fridovich-Keil, David et al.
An Iterative Quadratic Method for General-Sum Differential Games
with Feedback Linearizable Dynamics
David Fridovich-Keil*, Vicenc¸ Rubies-Royo*, and Claire J. Tomlin
Abstract— Iterative linear-quadratic (ILQ) methods are
widely used in the nonlinear optimal control community. Recent
work has applied similar methodology in the setting of multi-
player general-sum differential games. Here, ILQ methods are
capable of finding local Nash equilibria in interactive motion
planning problems in real-time. As in most iterative procedures,
however, this approach can be sensitive to initial conditions and
hyperparameter choices, which can result in poor computa-
tional performance or even unsafe trajectories. In this paper, we
focus our attention on a broad class of dynamical systems which
are feedback linearizable, and exploit this structure to improve
both algorithmic reliability and runtime. We showcase our new
algorithm in three distinct traffic scenarios, and observe that
in practice our method converges significantly more often and
more quickly than was possible without exploiting the feedback
linearizable structure.
I. INTRODUCTION
In robotics, a wide variety of decision making prob-
lems, including low-level control, motion planning, and
task planning, are often best expressed as optimal control
problems. Specific algorithms and solution strategies may
differ depending upon factors such as system dynamics
and cost structure; yet, modern methods such as model
predictive control have proven extremely effective in many
applications of interest. Still, optimal control formulations
are fundamentally limited to solving decision problems for
a single agent.
Dynamic game theory—the study of games played over
time—provides a natural extension of optimal control to
the multi-agent setting. For example, nearby vehicles at an
intersection (e.g., Fig. 1) mutually influence one another as
they attempt to balance making forward progress in a de-
sired direction while avoiding collision. Abstractly, dynamic
games provide each agent, or “player,” a separate input to
the system, and allow each player to have a different cost
function which they wish to optimize. Players may wish
to cooperate with one another in some situations and not
cooperate in others, leading to complicated, coupled optimal
play. Moreover, different players may know different pieces
of information at any point in time. Optimal play depends
strongly upon this information structure; a player with an
informational advantage can often exploit that knowledge to
Department of EECS, UC Berkeley, {dfk, vrubies,
tomlin}@eecs.berkeley.edu. ∗ indicates equal contribution.
This research is supported by an NSF CAREER award, the Air Force
Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR), NSF’s CPS FORCES and VeHICaL
projects, the UC-Philippine-California Advanced Research Institute, the
ONR BRC grant for Multibody Systems Analysis, a DARPA Assured
Autonomy grant, and the SRC CONIX Center. D. Fridovich-Keil is also
supported by an NSF Graduate Research Fellowship.
-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
-50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
-40 -20 0 20 40 60
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 1: Three traffic scenarios—(a) intersection, (b) high speed overtaking,
and (c) roundabout merging—which we formulate as differential games and
use to benchmark the performance of our method and a baseline [1].
the detriment of any competitors. For example, in poker a
player who cheats and looks at the top card in the deck is
more certain of who will win the next hand, and hence can
assume less risk in betting.
In this paper, we consider dynamic games played in con-
tinuous time, or differential games. Historically, differential
games were first studied in zero-sum (perfectly competitive)
settings such as pursuit-evasion problems [2]. Here, optimal
play is described by the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI) PDE,
in which the Hamiltonian includes a minimax optimization
problem that encodes the instantaneous preferences of both
players. These results extend to general-sum games as well,
in which optimal play follows coupled HJ equations [3, 4].
Unfortunately, numerical solutions to these coupled PDEs
often prove intractable because they operate on a densely
discretized state space. Approximate dynamic programming
methods [5] offer a promising alternative; still, computational
efficiency remains a significant challenge.
Recently, the robotics community has shown renewed
interest in dynamic and differential games, with a variety of
new approximate algorithms for identifying locally optimal
play. For example, Sadigh et al. [6] optimize the behavior
of a self-driving car while accounting for the reaction of
a human driver. Wang et al. [7] demonstrate a real-time
iterative best response algorithm for planning competitive
trajectories in a 6-player drone racing game. Building upon
the earlier sequential linear-quadratic method of [8] and the
well-known iterative linear-quadratic regulator [9, 10], our
own prior work [1] solves warm-started 3-player differential
games in under 50 ms each, operating single-threaded on a
consumer laptop.
In this paper, we extend and improve upon our previous
work [1] by exploiting the structure in a broad class of
dynamical systems. Many systems, including quadcopters
and the planar unicycle and bicycle models commonly used
to model automobiles, are feedback linearizable. That is,
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there exists a (nonlinear) control law which renders the
closed-loop input-output dynamics of these nonlinear sys-
tems linear. Here, we develop an algorithm for identifying
locally optimal play in differential games with feedback
linearizable dynamics. We establish theoretical equivalence
between the solutions identified using this algorithm and
those which do not exploit the feedback linearizable struc-
ture. By exploiting the structure, however, our algorithm
is able to take much larger steps at each iteration and
generally converge to an equilibrium more quickly and more
reliably than was previously possible. Experimental results
in Section VI confirm these computational advantages for
the interactive traffic scenarios shown in Fig. 1.
II. RELATED WORK
To put our work in context, here we provide a brief sum-
mary of iterative linear-quadratic (ILQ) methods of solving
differential games, other approximate techniques of solving
games, and common ways in which feedback linearization
is used to accelerate motion planning.
A. ILQ methods and other approximate techniques
Iterative linear-quadratic (ILQ) methods are increasingly
popular in the nonlinear model predictive control (MPC)
and motion planning communities [9, 11]. These algorithms
refine an initial control law at each iteration by forming a
Jacobian linearization of system dynamics and a quadratic
approximation of cost, and solving the resulting LQR sub-
problem. Because LQ games also offer an efficient solu-
tion, this approach has also been applied in the context of
two-player zero-sum differential games by [8] and recently
extended in [1] to the N -player general-sum setting. ILQ
methods are local. For optimal control problems, this means
that they generally converge to local optima; for differential
games, if they converge, they converge to local Nash equi-
libria under certain conditions [1, Theorem 1]. Importantly,
these methods scale favorably with state dimension (cubic),
number of players (cubic), and time horizon (linear), and [1]
reports real-time operation for several three-player examples.
Iterative best response (IBR) algorithms comprise another
class of methods for solving games. Here, in each iteration
players sequentially solve (or approximately solve) the op-
timal control problem which results when all other players’
strategies are fixed. IBR has been demonstrated in a wide
variety of settings, including congestion games [12], drone
racing [7], and autonomous driving [13]. As in the case of
ILQ methods, convergence is not generally guaranteed for
arbitrary initializations and, at best, IBR converges to local
Nash equilibria (e.g., [7]). However, by reducing the game
to a sequence of optimal control problems, IBR algorithms
can take advantage of existing MPC and planning tools.
B. Feedback linearization in motion planning
Feedback linearization is a popular differential geometric
control technique which renders a class of nonlinear systems’
input-output response linear. We provide a brief technical
overview of feedback linearization in Section IV; here, we
summarize its relevance to motion planning. One of the early
successes of feedback linearization was its effectiveness in
planning for chained systems, e.g., a car with multiple trailers
[14, 15]. Feedback linearization (and the related notion of
differential flatness) is also commonly used for minimum
snap control of quadrotors [16, 17]. Here, the differentially
flat structure of the underlying system dynamics allows
planners to generate piecewise polynomial trajectories which
the system can track exactly. This concept is extended to the
case of differential games in [7], where each iteration of IBR
yields a new spline trajectory.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider N -player, general-sum differential games
with control-affine dynamics. That is, we presume that the
game state x ∈ Rn evolves as
x˙ = f(x) +
N∑
i=1
gi(x)ui , (1)
where ui ∈ Rki is the control input of player i. In our
examples (Section VI), x will be the concatenated states
of multiple subsystems, but this is not strictly necessary.
We assume that (1) is full-state feedback linearizable, i.e.
there exist outputs y = h(x) such that y and finitely
many of its time derivatives evolve linearly as a function
of some auxiliary inputs zi ∈ Rki , for some control law
ui := ui(x, zi). A brief review of feedback linearization may
be found in Section IV.
Next, we suppose that each player i wishes to minimize a
running cost `i over finite time horizon T :
Ji(u1, . . . , uN ) :=
∫ T
0
`i(t, x, u1, . . . , uN )dt . (2)
We shall require `i to be C2 in x, uj ,∀j, uniformly in time
t. Player i’s total cost Ji then depends explicitly upon each
player’s control input signal ui(·) and implicitly upon the
initial condition x(0).
Finally, we presume that each player i has access to the
state x at every time t, but not other players’ control inputs
uj , j 6= i, i.e.
ui(t) ≡ γi
(
t, x(t)
)
(3)
for some measurable function γi : [0, T ] × Rn → Rki . We
shall denote the set of such functions Γi. For clarity, we
shall also overload the notation of costs Ji(γ1; . . . ; γN ) ≡
Ji
(
γ1(·, x(·)), . . . , γN (·, x(·))
)
.
Thus equipped with dynamics (1), costs (2), and informa-
tion pattern (3) we seek Nash equilibria of the game.
Definition 1: (Nash equilibrium, [18, Chapter 6]) A set of
strategies (γ∗1 , . . . , γ
∗
N ) constitute a Nash equilibrium if no
player has a unilateral incentive to deviate from his or her
strategy. Precisely, the following inequality must hold for
each player i:
J∗i ≡ Ji(γ∗1 , . . . , γ∗i−1, γ∗i , γ∗i+1, . . . , γ∗N )
≤ Ji(γ∗1 , . . . , γ∗i−1, γi, γ∗i+1, . . . , γ∗N ),∀γi ∈ Γi .
In practice, we shall only be able to check if these condi-
tions are satisfied locally in the neighborhood of strategy γ∗i .
That is, we will only be able to verify whether our algorithm
has found a local Nash equilibrium.
IV. BACKGROUND: FEEDBACK LINEARIZATION
This section provides a brief review of feedback lineariza-
tion, a geometric control technique popularly used across a
wide range of robotic applications including manipulation,
quadrotor flight, and autonomous driving.
Recall dynamics (1), and define the matrix
g(x) := [g1(x), . . . , gN (x)] ∈ Rn×k and vector
uT = [uT1 , . . . , u
T
N ] ∈ Rk, with k =
∑
i ki the total
control dimension. Thus, (1) may be rewritten as
x˙ = f(x) + g(x)u, y = h(x) (4)
where y is the output of the system, and the functions f, g,
and h are sufficiently smooth.
A. Mechanics
Suppose that (4) has well-defined vector relative degree
(r1, . . . , rk) [19, Definition 9.15] and is full-state feedback
linearizable. Then, there exists a matrix M(x) and vector
m(x) such that the time derivatives of the outputs y follow
[y
(r1)
1 , . . . , y
(rk)
k ]
T = M(x)u+m(x). (5)
Presuming the invertibility of the so-called “decoupling
matrix” M(x), we may design the following feedback lin-
earizing control law as a function of both state x and an
auxiliary input z ∈ Rk:
u(x, z) = M−1(x)(z −m(x)), (6)
which renders the input-output dynamics linear in the new
auxiliary inputs z:
[y
(r1)
1 , . . . , y
(rk)
k ]
T = z. (7)
Note that, as for u in (1) we shall consider zT =
[zT1 , . . . , z
T
N ] to be a concatenation of auxiliary inputs for
each player, with zi ∈ Rki .
B. Change of coordinates
We have seen how a careful choice of feedback linearizing
controller u(x, z) renders the dynamics of the output y and
its derivatives linear. Define the state of this linear system as
ξ := [y1, . . . , y
(r1−1)
1 , . . . , yk, . . . , y
(rk−1)
k ]
T . Just as there is
a bijective map (6) between control u and auxiliary input
z whenever M(x) is invertible, there is also a bijection
between state x and linear system state ξ, x = λ(ξ) [19]
because (4) is full-state feedback linearizable. We shall use
both bijective maps (and their derivatives) in Section V to
rewrite costs (2) in terms of the linearized dynamics (7).
V. METHODS
In this section we present our main contribution, a compu-
tationally stable and efficient algorithm for identifying local
Nash equilibria of general-sum games with feedback lineariz-
able dynamics. We begin in Section V-A by computing a
feedback linearizing controller for unicycle dynamics, which
we shall use as a running example throughout the paper.
Then, in Section V-B we show how to transform the costs
for each player to depend upon linear system state ξ and
auxiliary inputs zi rather than state x and controls ui. In
Section V-C we introduce the main algorithm, and finally
in Section V-D we summarize the effects of using feedback
linearization.
A. Feedback linearization by example
Consider the following (single player) 4D unicycle dy-
namical model:
x˙ =

p˙x
p˙y
θ˙
v˙
 =

v cos θ
v sin θ
w
a
 , y = [pxpy
]
(8)
representing the evolution of the positions px and py , the
orientation θ, and speed v. The inputs w and a represent the
angular rate and the acceleration. By taking time derivatives
of the output y following the procedure from Section IV,
we obtain the new set of states ξ = [px, p˙x, py, p˙y]T for the
linearized system. Differentiation reveals that[
p¨x
p¨y
]
=
[−v sin θ cos θ
v cos θ sin θ
] [
w
a
]
. (9)
From this result, we compute the inverse decoupling matrix
and drift term as
M−1(x) =
[
cos θ sin θ
− sin θ/v − cos θ/v
]
, m(x) = 0. (10)
Finally, we can also explicitly derive the state conversion
map λ(ξ)
λ(ξ) =

px
py√
p˙2x + p˙
2
y
tan−1( p˙yp˙x )
 . (11)
Now, consider a differential game with two players, each
of whom independently follows dynamics (8). The inverse
decoupling matrix M−1(x) and the Jacobian of the state
conversion map λ for the full system will be block diagonal.
B. Transforming costs
So far, we have introduced feedback linearization and
shown how to derive the mappings from auxiliary input z to
control u and linearized system state ξ to state x. To exploit
the feedback linearizable structure of (4) when solving the
game, we must rewrite running costs `i(t, x, u1, . . . , uN ) in
Algorithm 1: Feedback Linearized Iterative LQ Games
Input: initial linearized system state ξ(0) and control
strategies {γ0i }i∈{1,...,N}, time horizon T
Output: converged control strategies {γ∗i }i∈{1,...,N} for
the linearized system
1 for iteration p = 1, 2, . . . do
2 µp ≡ {ξˆ(t), zˆi(t)}i∈{1,...,N},t∈[0,T ] ←
3 getTrajectory
(
ξ(0), {γp−1i }
)
;
4 {li(t), Qi(t), Rij(t)} ← quadraticizeCost
(
µp
)
;
5 {γ˜pi } ← solveLQGame
({li(t), Qi(t), Rij(t)});
6 {γpi } ← stepToward
({γp−1i , γ˜pi });
7 if converged then
8 return {γpi }
terms of ξ and z. Overloading notation, we shall denote the
transformed running costs as
`i(t; ξ; z1; . . . ; zN ) ≡
`i
(
t;λ(ξ);u1
(
λ(ξ), z1
)
; . . . ;uN
(
λ(ξ), zN
))
,
(12)
where ui(λ(ξ), zi) is given in (6).
Section V-C presents our main algorithm; a core step will
be to compute first and second derivatives of each player’s
running cost with respect to the new state ξ and inputs
zi. This may be done efficiently using the chain rule and
exploiting known sparsity patterns for particular systems and
costs. For completeness, however, we shall ignore sparsity
and illustrate computing the first derivative of `i with respect
to the jth dimension of ξ, denoted ξj :
∂`i
∂ξj
=
n∑
p=1
∂`i
∂xp
∂xp
∂ξj
+
N∑
n=1
kn∑
p=1
∂`i
∂un,p
n∑
q=1
∂un,p
∂xq
∂xq
∂ξj
(13)
where un,p is the pth entry of the nth player’s control input.
Second derivatives may be computed similarly, though
again we stress that for specific dynamics and cost functions
it is often much more efficient to exploit the a priori known
sparsity of partial derivatives. Interestingly, we also observe
that the terms arising from the second sum in (13), which
account for the state-dependence of the feedback linearizing
controllers (6), are often negligible in practice and may be
dropped without significant impact on solution quality.
C. Core algorithm
Like the original iterative LQ game algorithm, we proceed
from a set of initial strategies γi for each player—understood
now to map from (t, ξ) to zi—and iteratively refine them by
solving LQ approximations. Our main contribution, there-
fore, lies in the transformation of the game itself into the
coordinates ξ, zi which correspond to feedback linearized
dynamics. As we shall see in Section VI, iterative LQ
approximations are much more stable in the transformed
coordinates and converge at least as quickly.
Algorithm 1 outlines the major steps in the resulting
algorithm. We begin at the given initial condition ξ(0) for
the linearized system and strategies γ0i for each player. Note
that these strategies define control laws for the linearized
system, i.e. zi(t) ≡ γi
(
t, ξ(t)
)
.
At each iteration, we first (Algorithm 1, line 3) integrate
the linearized dynamics (7) forward to obtain the current
operating point (ξˆ(·), {zˆi(·)}). Then (Algorithm 1, line 4),
we compute a quadratic approximation to each player’s
running cost in terms of the variations δξ := ξ − ξˆ and
δzj := zj − zˆj
`i(t; ξ; z1; . . . ; zN )− `i(t; ξˆ; zˆ1; . . . ; zˆN ) ≈
li(t)
T δξ +
1
2
(
δξTQi(t)δξ +
N∑
j=1
δzTj Rij(t)δzj
)
,
(14)
using the chain rule as in (12) to compute the terms li, Qi
and Rij for each player.
Equipped with linear dynamics (7) and quadratic costs
(14), the solution of the resulting general-sum LQ game
is given by a set of coupled Riccati differential equations,
which may be derived from the first order necessary condi-
tions of optimality for each player [18, Chapter 6]. In practice
(Algorithm 1, line 5), we numerically solve these equations
in discrete-time using a time step of ∆t. If a solution exists
at the pth iteration, it is known to take the form
γ˜pi (t, ξ) ≡ zˆi(t)− P pi (t)
(
ξ(t)− ξˆ(t))− αpi (t) (15)
for matrix P pi (t) and vector α
p
i (t) [18, Corollary 6.1].
We cannot simply use these strategies at the (p + 1)th
iteration or we risk diverging, however, without further as-
sumptions on the curvature and convexity of running costs `i.
In fact, these costs are generally nonconvex when expressed
in terms of ξ and zj (12), which necessitates some care
in updating strategies. To address this issue (Algorithm 1,
line 6), we follow a common practice in the ILQR and
sequential quadratic programming literature (e.g., [20]) and
introduce a step size parameter η ∈ (0, 1]:
γpi (t, ξ) = zˆi(t)− P pi (t)
(
ξ(t)− ξˆ(t))− ηαpi (t). (16)
Observe that, taking η = 0 and recalling that ξ(0) = ξˆ(0),
we recover the previous open-loop control signal γpi (t, ξ) =
zˆi,∀t ∈ [0, T ]. Taking η = 1, we recover the LQ solution
from this iteration (15). As is common in the literature, we
perform a backtracking linesearch on η, starting with initial
value η0 and terminating when the trajectory that results
from (16) satisfies a trust region constraint at level . In our
experiments, we use an L∞ constraint, i.e.
‖ξ(t)− ξˆ(t)‖∞ < ,∀t, (17)
and also check to ensure that M−1 exists at each time.
D. Effect of feedback linearization
We conclude this section with several remarks about the
theoretical soundness of our approach and the overall impact
of exploiting feedback linearization.
Remark 1: (Criterion for Convergence to Local Nash
Equilibrium) Suppose that Algorithm 1 converges to strate-
gies {γ∗i }. Then, from [1, Theorem 1] and presum-
ing the invertibility of M we have that if Hessians
Dxx
(
`i(t)
)
, Duiuj
(
`i(t)
)  0,∀t at convergence, then the
open-loop controllers defined by zi(t) = zˆ∗i (t) comprise
a local Nash equilibrium in open-loop strategies for the
original system. That is, taking
u∗(t) = M−1
(
λ
(
ξˆ∗(t)
))(
zˆ∗(t)−m(λ(ξˆ∗(t))))
we obtain a local Nash equilibrium in open loop strategies
for the game defined by dynamics (1) and costs (2).
Remark 2: (Benefits of Feedback Linearization) In com-
parison to the non-feedback linearizable case, the linearized
dynamics (7) are trajectory- (and hence iteration-) inde-
pendent. That is, in the non-feedback linearizable case [1],
each iteration begins by constructing a Jacobian linearization
of dynamics (1); this is superfluous in our case. As a
consequence, large changes in auxiliary input z between
iterations—which lead to large changes in state trajectory—
are trivially consistent with the feedback linearized dynamics
(7). By contrast, a large change in control u may take the
nonlinear dynamics (1) far away from the previous Jacobian
linearization, which causes the algorithm from [1] to be fairly
sensitive to step size η and trust region size . We study this
sensitivity more carefully in Section VI.
Remark 3: (Drawbacks of Feedback Linearization) While
many systems of interest (e.g., manipulators, cars, and
quadrotors) are feedback linearizable, this is not true of all
systems. Additionally, there are two major drawbacks of our
algorithm. First, we must take care to avoid singularities
(regions in which M−1 does not exist), especially when
constructing the costs. Second, and more importantly, the
transformed costs `i(t; ξ; . . . ) may have much more varied,
extreme curvature than the original costs `i(t, x, . . . ). In
some cases, this can make Algorithm 1 sensitive to line-
search parameters η0 and , even offsetting the benefits from
Remark 2. We defer further discussion and empirical study
for Section VI.
VI. RESULTS
In this section, we study the empirical performance of
Algorithm 1. In Section VI-A, we quantify the improvements
in algorithmic stability from Remark 2 for an intersection
scenario. In Section VI-B, we discuss a case in which
the extreme curvature of the transformed cost `i(t; ξ; . . . )
alluded to in Remark 3 causes Algorithm 1 to converge very
slowly. In practice, however, this is not necessarily a serious
problem. In Section VI-C, we redesign this problematic cost
function to depend explicitly upon ξ rather than x without
changing the semantic character of equilibria.
A. Improvements in solver stability
To showcase the benefits of our feedback linearization-
based approach, we study the empirical sensitivity of so-
lutions to the initial step size η0 and trust region size 
hyperparameters from Section V-C. We shall consider a
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Fig. 2: Distribution of pairs (η0, ) colored by quality metric q. Pairs with
low q are colored blue, and high q pairs are colored red.
three-player intersection example and compare the strategies
identified by Algorithm 1 with those identified on the original
dynamics, using the algorithm from [1]. Here, two cars,
modeled with bicycle dynamicsp˙xp˙y
θ˙
 =
 v cos θv sin θ
(v/L) tanφ
 ,
v˙φ˙
a˙
 =
aω
κ
 (18)
(with inter-axle distance L and inputs ω controlling front
wheel rate φ˙ and κ controlling jerk), and a pedestrian
modeled with dynamics (8) navigate an intersection. Like (8),
bicycle dynamics (18) are feedback linearizable in the out-
puts (px, py). We place quadratic penalties on each player’s
distance from the appropriate lane center and from a fixed
goal location, as well as on the difference between speed
v and a fixed nominal speed v¯. Players are also penalized
quadratically within a fixed distance of one another.
In order to assess the quality of a trajectory
µ = (ξ, z1, . . . , zN ) generated by a particular algorithm, we
define the following metric:
q(µ, µ˜) := max
t∈[0,T ]
‖ξ(t)− ξ˜(t)‖2,(px,py). (19)
Here, we take µ˜ := (ξ˜, z˜1, . . . , z˜N ) to be the equilibrium
trajectory which that algorithm ideally converges to. The
norm measures Euclidean distance only in the (px, py)
dimensions. Trajectories that diverge or converge to unrea-
sonable solutions yield high values for q, while trajectories
that closely match µ˜ incur low values.
We fix the initial conditions and cost weights identically
for both algorithms. Thus, any trajectory µ identified by the
solver will solely be a function of the initial step size η0 and
trust region size . Therefore, we will overload the penalty
metric notation as q(η0; ). Given this metric we study the
quality of solutions over the ranges η0 ∈ [0.1, 0.75] and  ∈
[1.0, 10.0], and test 324 uniformly sampled (η0, ) pairs.
Fig. 2 displays the sampled pairs over the space of η0
and . For clarity, we set a success threshold q∗ and color
“successful” pairs with q(η0; ) ≤ q∗ blue, and “unsucessful”
pairs red. Fig. 3 shows histograms of solution quality q
for each algorithm, with a horizontal line denoting thresh-
old q∗. We observe that solving the game using feedback
linearization converges much more reliably than solving it
for the original nonlinear system. Moreover, for converged
trajectories with low q-value, the average computation time
was 0.3982± 0.3122 s (mean ± standard deviation) for our
method and 0.8744± 0.9582 s for the baseline.
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Fig. 3: Comparison of the proposed algorithm with the state of the art
[1] for a three player intersection game. Histograms (left, baseline; right,
ours) show that our method is much more numerically stable and converges
more frequently. Insets labelled {A, B, C, D} show a typical trajectory for
the associated bin. The dotted horizontal line shows threshold q∗, used to
distinguish samples from Fig. 2.
B. Sensitivity to transformed cost landscape
Unfortunately, these results do not generalize to all games.
As per Remark 3, in some cases the cost landscape gets
much more complicated when expressed in linearized system
coordinates ξ, zi. For example, a simple quadratic penalty on
a single player’s speed difference from nominal v¯ in (8) is
nonconvex and non-smooth near the origin when expressed
as a function of linearized system state ξ:
(v − v¯)2 ⇐⇒
(
v¯ −
√
p˙2x + p˙
2
y
)2
. (20)
Consequences vary; the effect is negligible in the intersection
example from Fig. 3, but it is more significant in the
roundabout example below in Section VI-C, where cars must
slow down before turning into the roundabout.
C. Designing costs directly for the linearized system
Fortunately, in practical settings of interest it is typically
straightforward to design smooth, semantically equivalent
costs explicitly as functions of the linearized system coordi-
nates ξ. For example, we can replace the nominal speed cost
of (20) with a time-varying quadratic penalty in that player’s
position (px, py):
(v − v¯)2 =⇒ (px(t)− p¯x(t))2 + (py(t)− p¯y(t))2, (21)
where
(
p¯x(·), p¯y(·)
)
defines the point on the lane center a
distance v¯t from the initial condition.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of this substitution in
two examples—merging into a roundabout, and overtaking a
lead vehicle—in which the original cost (20) led to instability
in Algorithm 1. In both cases, we also use simple quadratic
penalties for zi (rather than transforming ‖ui‖2 into lin-
earized coordinates), albeit with different weightings. Results
for the roundabout merging and overtaking examples are
shown in Figures 4 and 5, respectively. From the 324 samples
in each (drawn from expanded ranges η0 ∈ [0.1, 1.0],  ∈
[1, 50]), we see that Algorithm 1 converged more frequently
than the method of [1]. Moreover, when successful, the
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Fig. 4: Comparison for a roundabout merging example with four cars.
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Fig. 5: Comparison for a three vehicle high speed overtaking maneuver.
average computational time in the roundabout example was
0.2797 ± 0.1274 s for our method and 0.4244 ± 0.5259 s
for the baseline. Runtimes for the overtaking example were
0.5112± 0.3228 s (ours) and 0.4417± 0.4142 s (baseline).
Observe how runtimes for our approach cluster more tightly
around the mean, indicating a more reliable convergence rate.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have presented a novel algorithm for identifying local
Nash equilibria in differential games with feedback lineariz-
able dynamics. Our method works by repeatedly solving LQ
games in the linearized system coordinates, rather than in the
original system coordinates. By working with the linearized
system, our algorithm becomes less sensitive to parameters
such as initial step size and trust region size, which often
leads it to converge more quickly. Our method is fully
general, i.e. any cost expressed in terms of nonlinear system
coordinates may also be expressed in terms of linearized
coordinates, which implies sufficient conditions for fixed
points of our algorithm to be local Nash equilibria. However,
in some cases transforming costs in this way makes the cost
landscape extremely complicated. In such cases, it is often
possible to design semantically equivalent replacement costs
directly in the linearized coordinates. We test our method in a
variety of competitive traffic scenarios. Using appropriately
redesigned costs when necessary, our experiments confirm
the computational stability and efficiency of our approach.
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